IMAGINING THE PAST; REMEMBERING
THE FUTURE
JERRY MASHAW*

When writing a short Comment on two long Articles it is difficult to
be both substantive and polite. The available space must be devoted
largely to points of disagreement, not to the authors' many fine arguments and insights. I therefore urge the reader to remember that this
commentary lacks balance. My admiration for the projects that Chris
Edley and Cass Sunstein have begun-projects that contemplate the dismantling and reconstruction of American administrative law-will take
a back seat to my concerns about the current directions of their particular enterprises.
At its most general level my critique is captured in the title of this
Comment. In my view, Edley and Sunstein imagine the past of administrative law that represents but a partial understanding of where we have
been and where we have come. They then propose a future that is, I fear,
made up primarily of the recollection and extension of reforms that have
already been attempted. Thus, their arguments have modest capacities,
if applied generally, to do more good than harm.1
I. THE EDLEY CHALLENGE
According to Chris Edley, the administrative state has failed. He
describes a polity beset by maladies ranging from homelessness and
crack-babies to the savings and loan debacle and the crisis of Third
World debt. 2 Americans, in his view, are being denied "sound governance": the sort of activist, imaginative governance that would solve
3
those problems, and many more like them.
*
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1. As contemplated by the organizers of this symposium, Edley and Sunstein have produced
papers that rehearse and elaborate the arguments in their recent books. See C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). I trust that a commentator will be forgiven if his comments are similarly often drawn from a recent book. See J.
MASHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).

2. See Edley, The Governance Crisis,Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, 1991 DUKE L.J.
561, 563-65.
3. See id. at 566-67.
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Strangely enough, Edley blames many of these late-twentieth-cen4
tury ills on the "antidiscretion project" of American administrative law.
Stranger yet, Edley sees the culprit to be the defective conceptualization
of this project as it is played out in administrative law doctrine, that is, in
the principles enunciated and applied by the judiciary when reviewing
administrative action.5 Specifically, he suggests that the problems with
administrative law doctrine fall into two categories. First, administrative
law's conceptualizations are built on what Edley describes as "eighteenth-century sensibilities"; in particular, a continuing commitment to
the separation of powers.6 Second, these ideas are beset by normative
dualities and boundary problems that make them hopelessly indeterminate. 7 The work of the courts in developing and applying doctrine thus
exhibits a pervasive character of "ambivalence and inconsistency." 8
As I understand Edley's argument, the solution to our multiple ills
lies in breaking out of the symbolic shackles of the eighteenth-century
separation of powers mindset. The escape from this intellectual bondage
will occur when courts recognize that they are, like other governmental
institutions, firmly embedded in politics. If these newly politicized courts
then adopt an appropriate ideology of governance-one that emphasizes
transformation and fluidity, participation and engagement, and skepticism toward any stable set of institutional arrangements-then we will be
on the way to solving the current governance crisis.
Edley summarizes this vision of the future in a few ringing lines:
Administrative law can be part of the developing critique and renovation of governance, but only if it abandons its implicit antidiscretion project. That project embodies tension between two elements.
One is the affirmative goal of strengthening the administrative state by,
for example, promoting the integration of expertise into bureaucratic
action. The other is the imitation of separation of powers formalism,
with the trichotomy of decisionmaking paradigms [adjudicatory fairness, science, and politics] as a sort of second-best structural strategy
to protect us against arbitrary discretion and official ambition.
Instead, imagine that the core of administrative law can be committed to an ongoing exchange with the political branches about norms
of sound governance. I imagine a process of subconstitutional, common law elaboration of substantive and procedural matters ranging
from cost-benefit methodology, to the paper hearing requirements in
informal rulemaking, to presumptions about the direction of congres4. See id. at 566.
5. See id. at 566-67. I will later return to the question of exactly how defective legal concepts
come to be so implicated in the concrete ills of American (and even international) society. For now
we will note only the alleged defects in administrative law's intellectual arsenal.
6. See id. at 567.
7. See id. at 570.

8. Id. at 574.
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sional policies trenching on such fundamental social concerns as federalism and income redistribution.
The new administrative law would have no place for such cases as
Chevron, Vermont Yankee, or last term's decision in Pension Benefit
GuaranteeCorp. v. LTV Corp.9
I must confess that I find these paragraphs deeply puzzling. A critique of
the Edley project requires three interconnected inquiries. First, we must
try to understand clearly his complaint against administrative law. Second, we must try to understand how that complaint maps on to the doctrine of administrative law that he would abandon. Finally, we must try
to imagine how a revised ideology would generate a revised administrative law doctrine that would promote the goals that Edley espouses, or at
least promote those goals better than the existing doctrine that he rejects.
Given his critique of separation of powers thinking, Edley's desire to
cast away Chevron 10 and Vermont Yankee 11 comes as a real surprise. I
am hard-pressed to think of two decisions that are better examples of the
abandonment of those doctrinal formulations against which Edley levels
his critique. On my cheerful interpretation of its meaning, Chevron candidly rejects two conventional tenets of separation of powers formalism:
First, that Congress decides all policy questions (or should); 12 and, second, that courts decide all questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation. 13 Chevron straightforwardly admits that Congress
can delegate important policy choices to an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) administrator, that administrations are in politics, including electoral politics, and that agencies carrying out administrative duties
are given a policy choice that is both connected to presidential politics
and legitimized by it. 14 This recognition of the political connectedness of
administration is then combined with the recognition that statutory interpretation includes policy choice. Statutory interpretation may, therefore, be appropriately allocated to politico-administrative institutions,
subject only to very loose judicial review.
In some ways it is hard to imagine a case that better exemplifies the
rejection of "formalist" separation of powers categorizations of the conventional sort, i.e., legislators enact the law, judges interpret the law, and
administrators execute the law. In addition, Chevron seems to promote
two more of Edley's goals: (1) "the integration of expertise into bureau9. Id. at 601 (footnotes omitted).
10. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
12. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
13. See id. at 863-64.
14. See id. at 865-66.

714

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1991:711

cratic action" and (2) "an ongoing exchange with the political branches
about norms of sound governance." 1 5 Indeed, the EPA decision under
review in Chevron so combined technical expertise with judgments about
techniques of sound governance that the line between the two virtually
6
disappeared.'
A similar story can be told about Vermont Yankee. That case
quintessentially legitimatizes the authority of agencies to experiment
with procedural techniques that are short of trial-type adjudication. The
Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee approved an elaborate and unique
governance structure for nuclear plant licensing that fit no pre-determined mold based on administrative law's so-called "trichotomy."'' 7
Moreover, in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,Inc., I the Court looked carefully at the question of governance
that was embedded in the substantive dispute about the potential costs of
nuclear waste disposal 19 and approved an approach to evaluating environmental impacts that focused political responsibility at the national
level. 20 In so doing, the Court elaborated a "subconstitutional, common
law" that went directly to the institutional or governance issues surrounding cost-benefit or risk-benefit evaluation. 2' The Court thus made
a clear (albeit surely contestable) statement concerning "sound
governance."
Indeed, as I think about Edley's call for the courts to develop "presumptions" concerning "the direction of congressional policies trenching
on such fundamental social concerns as federalism," 22 I can hardly avoid
noting that the Supreme Court seems to be doing just that, both in its
eleventh amendment jurisprudence2 3 and in its interpretations of the
reach of federal grant-in-aid statutes. 24 In addition, one of the strongest
lines of "presumptive" statutory interpretation that has been developed
15. Edley, supra note 2,.at 601.
16. The case was, after all, concerned with a highly complex air quality regulation that involved
both new environmental criteria and a new institutional policy that married existing command-andcontrol methodologies of regulatory action to market-like structures for allocating regulatory costs.
17. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 526. The term "trichotomy" is Edley's. See Edley, supra
note 2, at 568-69.
18. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
19. Id. at 89-90.
20. id at 105.
21. Edley, supra note 2, at 601.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-47 (1985) (giving a series of
constitutional reasons to require the clearest possible expression of congressional intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
24. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) (requiring a clear congressional intent to impose financial obligations on states with respect to mental

institutions).
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over the last decade involves another of the Court's "sound governance"
projects-the avoidance of fragmented interpretative and enforcement
jurisdictions in the implementation of comprehensive schemes of federal
25
administrative regulation.
If Edley is unhappy with these developments, it seems clear that his
unhappiness flows from the results of the cases, not from their inattention to the categories of concerns with which he is interested. Moreover,
there is a common feature to the jurisprudence that has been discussed:
In every case the activities of the courts have withdrawn judicial jurisdiction in favor of administrative jurisdiction. The real complaint here
seems to be one concerning judicial restraint. But that merely restates
the problem. Why should an author who favors energetic, activist, and
imaginative governance be concerned about judicial restraint in the face
of governmental initiatives?
Three explanations come quickly to mind: politics, conceptualism,
and optimism. The political explanation I will quickly put aside as inappropriate to serious academic discussion. The liberal, Democratic vision
of state activism has not been furthered by the congressional-presidential
political partnerships of the past two decades. If one's real concern is
with "jump-starting" national governance, perhaps one might fall back
on the courts as the last resort to provide the juice to "get the country
moving again." But if so, we would still need to know why that project
seems feasible, a topic to which we will return under the heading of
"optimism."
A more interesting explanation is that Edley is so convinced of the
defectiveness of administrative law's conceptual apparatus that he
equates conceptual-doctrinal reform with governmental efficacy. There
is evidence in his article that would support this explanation. Much of
Edley's discussion focuses on the ambivalence and incoherence ("normative duality" and "contradictions") of legal doctrine. 26 Yet, although
one might agree with much of this discussion as a descriptive matter, the
linkage between conceptual confusion and practical political malfunctioning is left unexplained.
Indeed, given Edley's description, this causal connection is decidedly peculiar. On the one hand, administrative law doctrine is so ambivalent and confused that it is thoroughly ineffective-even in its supposed
major project of controlling administrative discretion. Yet, somehow,
this same confused, ambivalent, and ineffective doctrine is to be credited
25. See, eg., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
11 (1981) (excluding both implied private rights of actions and § 1983 actions where federal statutes
comprehensively regulate a field).
26. See Edley, supra note 2, at 570; C. EDLEY, supra note 1, at 83-86.
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with the destruction of sound governance, and with the various social ills
paraded at the beginning of the piece. 27 How can administrative law
doctrine be ineffectual in restraining the exercise of official discretion and
simultaneously be the cause of ineffectual governance?
One possible explanation is Edley's apparent belief that effective
governmental arrangements must establish decision processes that permit
a straightforward ratio-deductive explanation of all decisionmaking in
terms of the law's ostensibly guiding political ideology. 28 In this view,
cross-cutting political purposes, "balancing" and "tradeoffs" among multiple values, along with compromised institutional structures, are simply
the hallmarks of bad government. As I have argued elsewhere, this is a
straightforward (if distressingly common) category mistake. 29 There is
no necessary relationship between conceptual coherence and governmental efficacy. Once it is admitted that human values are multiple and that
resources are scarce, conflicts amongst goals are inevitable. When one
adds to this the recognition that values or aims are abstractly held, but
must be concretely applied, there is simply no technique of legal decisionmaking that can avoid either the repeated confrontation of problems of
vagueness or the competition among goals near the boundaries of their
relevant applications.
As one looks at the goals stated by Edley for his revised political
ideology, one wonders how he imagines these values to be applied without stress, or even contradiction. The suggestion, for example, that we
should prefer transformation and fluidity, combined with participation
and engagement,3 0 yields an obvious conundrum. How is a set of legal
rules or institutions that promotes transformation and fluidity meant to
attract the participation and engagement of those who prefer stability
and hierarchy? Competition between these aims is inevitable.
Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning practical legal decisionmaking that does not find Edley's assertion that the injunction to prefer
these values should be preferred vague almost to the point of emptiness.
Does a preference for transformation and fluidity mean that we are to
eschew all structures that establish stability and hierarchy? If so, would
this preference include those structures that empower those who promote
the aims of transformation and fluidity? If not, what do the "rights"
asserted before these newly activist courts look like? To put the matter
in political rather than judicial terms, might not the requirements of par27. See Edley, supra note 2, at 564-65.
28. See id at 578-95.

29. See T.

MARMOR, J. MASHAW

& P.

STATE 222-28 (1990).

30. See Edley, supra note 2, at 594-95.

HARVEY, AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE
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ticipation or engagement entail a sense of accomplishment, that is, the
creation of enduring or quasi-enduring political results-structures or
decisions whose persistence would then discourage further participation
and engagement aimed at fluidity and transformation?
Examples of this sort are abundant, but the point is straightforward
and general. Any attempt to realize concretely the values that Edley affirms will reveal a host of potential contradictions. Pursuit of those goals
will necessarily be compromised and uncertain; any attempt at implementation will be subject to the critique that it reveals a shifting and
uncertain understanding of what these goals entail. Indeed, charges of
contradiction or, at least ambivalence, may cut much deeper because values like participation and engagement contain their own "internal" contradictions. They are simultaneously costs and benefits. How they will
be valued by any particular person or group shifts with time, issue, and
other relevant circumstances. And, if the sign to be given these values is
either plus or minus depending on context, then the critics will be quick
to point out, as Edley does with the current doctrine, 31 that we seem not
to have any guiding ideology of decisionmaking at all. Thus, if the critique of administrative law's current efficacy is a critique based largely on
conceptual incoherence, as it often seems to be in Edley's article, I find
myself unsympathetic to the message. This argument treats ubiquitous
aspects of the human condition--our ambivalence in the face of competing values and the practical conundra attending the implementation of
any abstract goal-as if they would disappear if we could just straighten
out our values and institutions.
But Edley's point may be a different one. He may not really believe
that the values he espouses can escape vagueness, competition, and contradictions. His point may be only that we are currently espousing the
wrong values, and that a different set, although generating their own normative dualities and contradictions in application, would nevertheless
have different concrete effects on governance. If so, I think that Edley
escapes conceptualism only at the cost of unjustified optimism.
As I understand his program, Edley imagines that a revitalized and
correctly politicized judiciary will stimulate and guide administrative
law's "sound governance project." This is wishful thinking at two levels.
First, it assumes a transformation of the judiciary from a brake into an
accelerator by thrusting the judiciary into political decisionmaking-a
transformation that is spectacularly unlikely given our political traditions. Second, even if this institutional transformation were to take
place, Edley's vision further presumes a judiciary that is, to use Bob
31. Seeid. at 575.
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Cover's terms, primarily jurisgenerative rather than jurispathic. 32 I find
very little in the past of administrative law, at least as developed through
judicial review, that supports such a view. And, although we might transcend our experience, Edley offers no innovative techniques to accomplish this. I will now unpack these two different levels of unjustified
optimism.
First, Edley imagines a judiciary that is committed to the primary
goals of transformation and fluidity and that unsettles questions rather
than settling them. In short, courts are goads to further action--constant kibitzers, whose forays into one or another administrative domain
are carried out under the banner of an activist, but otherwise unspecified,
reform agenda. Edley's judiciary breaks down hierarchy, unsettles stability, exhorts participation, and is highly skeptical of any stable institutional arrangements. Such an institutional role for the judiciary is surely
a transformative idea. It is a role, however, that judges have seldom
played in American legal life. And, when played by judges, it is a role
that is almost always immediately re-cast, if not written completely out
of the script. Tort law, particularly the development of products liability, may be the best twentieth-century example of a sustained judicial
activism that, over half a century, reorganized a major field. But even
here we sli6uld recognize that judicial "creativity" was largely a reaction
to social and economic reorganizations that both pressured existing doctrine and provided the intellectual underpinnings for doctrinal revision.
Technological and social change propelled the law. But as David Harfst
and I have recently recounted in reviewing the history of automobile
safety law, a truly new idea, that law should force technology, was beyond the judiciary's reach. 33 Thus, even the sustained judicial creativity
that recast the law of products liability evidenced judicial support for
fluidity and transformation of a very tepid sort. And, as seems customary when American courts are activist, these developments have generated dramatic political reaction to control the so-called products liability
34
"crisis."
When one turns directly to administrative law, the inherently conservative caste of judicial decisionmaking is thrown into even sharper
relief. The major post-New Deal innovation in administrative procedure
has been in what Edley identifies as the "paper hearing" process for ad32. See Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11-44 (1983).
33. See J. MASHAW & D. HARFST, supra note 1, at 39-46.
34. See, e.g., Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al, col. 2 (reporting speech by Vice President Quayle that argued that the
United States is too litigious and has too many excessive damage awards, resulting in a competitive
disadvantage for the United States in the world economy).
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ministrative rules. 35 But here I believe Edley's image of the recent past
of administrative law is deeply problematic. The paper-hearing innovation was largely of congressional and administrative creation, beginning
with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(MVSA). 36 From that moment forward Congress and agencies innovated while the courts struggled to keep up. In so doing, the courts developed a proceduralized rationality review that reinforced the
participatory and reason-giving requirements of congressional statutes
and administrative regulations. Yet, as Harfst and I again argue, these
developments were both profoundly reactive jurisprudentially and im37
mensely destructive for regulatory innovation.
Thus, although I agree that the common law elaboration of "paper
hearing" requirements to which Edley refers is probably the most "transformative" activity of the judiciary in administrative law over the past
several decades, it hardly evidences the swashbuckling reformative impulses that Edley's program demands. That history shows instead that
the intellectual resources upon which judges draw are deeply embedded
in a legal culture that is definitional for the judiciary as a legal institution.
Judicial "transformations" are but attempts to integrate new or truly
transformative events into that pre-existing culture. I see no reason to
believe that judges will (or should) be willing, or indeed able, to step
outside the legal culture to take on a new and truly creative or activist
role. To think that they will seems to imagine a past for administrative
law that never was. 38 Judges have not transformed rulemaking over the
past twenty-five years; they have instead reshaped it to fit within the preexisting vision of the judicial role and the rule of law. This is a deeply
conservative, not a jurisgenerative, enterprise.
Edley's over-optimism about recreating the legal culture is combined with a second equally unfounded optimism-the effects of judicial
activism on policy development. Harfst and I conclude, for example,
that judicial "creativity" in "proceduralizing" regulatory decisionmaking
concerning motor vehicle safety hardly invigorates that enterprise, but
instead bears a substantial portion of the blame for the lethargy and ineffectiveness of that potential transformative (indeed, intellectually revolutionary) regulatory scheme. 39 Shep Melnick makes similar findings
35. See Edley, supra note 2, at 601.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
37. See J. MASHAW & D. HAREST, supra note 1, at 95-103.
38. See, eg., Shapiro, APA: Past,Presentand Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986) (arguing that
court demands for synoptic rationality in administrative decisionmaking reflect a judicial preference
for the status quo).
39. See J. MASHAW & D. HARST, supra note 1, at 147-201.
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concerning air pollution control regulation, 40 which are echoed by John
Mendeloff's work on Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) regulation 4 and Dick Pierce's recent analysis of the looming electric power
crisis. 42 Moving out of the domain of regulation by rule, the dysfunctional policy effects of judicial review of administrative action have been
traced in welfare administration, 43 disability benefits adjudication, 44 labor law, 45 prison management, 46 public education, 47 and elsewhere. 48
To be sure, this chorus of complaint about judicial review is controversial. The dynamics of administrative action are too complex to place
enormous confidence in any ascription of causal efficacy-or, in these
studies, causes of inefficacy-however sophisticated the analysis. Yet the
puzzle remains. Why does Chris Edley place so much stock in judicial
salvation? As I recall the recent past of administrative law, there is substantial evidence that judicial action is inherently conservative in its conceptual content and often dysfunctional to the point of destruction with
respect to legislative and administrative attempts to construct innovative
regulatory policy.
II.

SUNSTEIN'S SUBSTANCE

Cass Sunstein is as unhappy with American administrative law as is
Chris Edley, but for quite different reasons. In Sunstein's view, we have
been so fixated on "procedure" and "judicial review" that we ignore
programmatic substance.4 9 What we need, he claims, is a set of interpretive principles that will assist legislators and administrators in the task of
programmatic and institutional design, and that will guide courts in helping administrators evade the multiple maladies that afflict administrative
50
systems.
40. See S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(1983).
41. See J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988).

42. See Pierce, The Unintended Effects ofJudicialReview ofAgency Rules: How FederalCourts
Have Contributed to the ElectricityCrisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991).
43. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198
(1983).
44. See J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 187-88 (1983).
45. See Winter, JudicialReview of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968
Sup. CT. REv. 53.
46. See J. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY (1977).
47. See D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).

48. See Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INTEREST 64 (1978).
49. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 611.
50. See id. at 631-42.
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Sunstein's argument restates in trenchant form most of his recent
claims about why an activist regulatory state is a good thing and why it
has characteristic failures or dysfunctions. 5 1 I find much of this discussion unobjectionable. Nevertheless, Sunstein's tendency to place greater
reliance on social science findings than they will bear, and his apparent
belief that the "substance" argued for in one regulatory domain is transportable to another with equally salutary effects,52 give me considerable
cause to doubt the efficacy of his reform program.
The latter tendency in particular suggests that Sunstein is remembering the future. Like the military that finds itself well-equipped to fight
the last war but woefully unprepared to fight the next one, reform programs built on this sort of foundation may find themselves unready for a
different set of tactical or strategic challenges. I will illustrate by reference to Sunstein's principal reform proposal-the replacement of regulatory commands with economic incentives. 5 3 First, I will consider the
question of the generalizability of the major substantive proposition Sunstein puts forward for a reconstructed administrative law. Second, I will
return to the question of how a substantive administrative law is to be
grounded. Finally, I will look at whether a move toward "substance," in
the sense that Sunstein employs that term, is indeed the right agenda for
administrative law scholarship.
A.

The Case for Incentives

Sunstein argues quite forcefully that command-and-control regula54
tion in the environmental arena has had some unhappy consequences.
Moreover, it is plausible that greater use of economic incentives would
promote more environmental protection at lower economic cost and with
a greater sense of the fairness and legitimacy of the regulatory process.
Sunstein is, of course, hardly alone, or even early, in promoting these
reforms in the environmental arena or in other domains of "social regulation."5 5 His distinctive contribution is to emphasize the gains that may
flow from market-like incentives in more than purely economic terms.
51. See, eg., Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 927;
Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989); Sunstein, Of
the Costs and Benefits ofAggressive JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522 (1989);
Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 407 (1990).
52. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 634-42 (advocating the use of market-based incentives in
environmental, occupational safety and health, and other areas).
53. See id. at 631-34.
54. See id. at 625.
55. See, e-g., Crandall, Why Should We Regulate Fuel Economy at All?, 3 BROOKINGS REV. 3
(1985) (arguing that Corporate Average Fuel Economy's (CAFE) original purposes are outmoded in
light of recent developments); R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 117-40 (1986) (arguing that it is unclear whether regulation of fuel econ-
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Although I agree that incentive systems have some excellent political
properties and that their distributional difficulties are often oversold, I
am much less sanguine than he concerning the political feasibility and
regulatory efficacy of substituting pricing for controls in many regulatory
environments. Let me say but a few words about political feasibility and
provide a somewhat more extended discussion of the problem of regulatory efficacy.
Political feasibility has at least two dimensions. The first is simply
practical politics. For example, although I agree with Sunstein that a
gasoline tax is vastly superior to Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) regulation, Congress remains steadfast in its political cowardice.
It insists on a regulatory regime that identifies automobile companies
(rather than American drivers) as both the perpetrators of crimes against
conservation and as the ones who will pay the price of their profligate
ways.

The second feasibility issue has to do with political symbolism. For
example, a very strong case can be made for explicit, workforce-based
quotas combined with free trade in "excess minority hires" to solve the
56
continued maldistribution of employment opportunities for minorities.
Yet there is very little chance that such a scheme would be adopted; not
only is no politician willing to be associated with the "Q word," the prospect of trading "discrimination rights" has, if anything, an even less
happy symbolic quality than trading "pollution rights." Emissions trading seems finally to have surmounted the charge that it makes environmental regulation into a "license to pollute." But this success cannot
negate the reality that the market often produces negative as well as positive political symbolism. Those negative features will often dissuade legislators from its use.
Perhaps even more importantly, market-like techniques have more
limited regulatory capacities than might appear at first glance. In many
circumstances (for example, the emissions trading case itself), the market
can allocate regulatory costs, but not set regulatory goals. Environmental standards must still be set by command. There is talk of "pollution
taxes," of course, in addition to emissions trading as incentive devices,
but here toO the level of the tax sets an implicit (and probably inexact)
omy has had an impact that would not have otherwise occurred due to outside forces such as a rise

in gasoline prices).
56. See Mashaw, Implementing Quotas, 79 GEo. L.J. 1769 (1991) (arguing that "discrimination trading" would be an essential implementing strategy for such a scheme); Strauss, The Law and
Economics of RacialDiscriminationin Employment: The Casefor Numerical Standards, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1619 (1991) (arguing for explicit national quotas as a substitute for current non-discrimination
policy).
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level of environmental quality. "The market" does not decide the appropriate level of environmental quality in these schemes; it instead only
allocates clean-up duties to those who can do so at the lowest cost. This
is no small gain, but we should not be lured into thinking that the use of
incentives avoids all the hard political choices involved in compelling the
production of environmental non-degradation in place of other goods
57
and services that an unregulated market would provide.
Consider an initial question: Why should we have automobile safety
regulation that attempts to reshape automotive technology to produce a
safer car? At first blush the idea is an odd one. After all, automobiles
are bought and sold in highly competitive markets-markets that overflow with good information. If consumers want safer cars, then their
demand in the marketplace will lead manufacturers to respond with supply. Indeed, there has long been a niche at the high end of the market for
cars that emphasized their capacity to avoid crashes and to protect their
occupants should accidents occur.5 8 Sunstein's admonition to use market incentives would here seem to support complete deregulation.
But not so fast. Our superficial examination may miss subtle forms
of market failure that cannot be corrected by a return to the market, or
to market-like incentives. The most general is a concern with preference
formation. Perhaps we want to desire safer cars, but we are all too susceptible to acting out other aspects of our personalities-demands for
power, status, and luxury-once we enter the dealer's showroom. If so,
it might make sense, as Cass Sunstein has himself so eloquently argued, 59
60
to impose some safety discipline on ourselves by regulation.
But it is not just symbolic or educative inappropriateness that sometimes counsels against using market incentives to shape behavior. In
some cases, markets cannot be organized effectively. This problem attends the other, more straightforward, market failure that might be
thought to beset the expression of consumer preferences for safer cars.
The story goes something like this: In a third-party liability system,
57. Even more dramatically, market incentives may be impossible to structure into many regu-

latory schemes. For example, in the motor vehicle safety arena, the problems of technical infeasibility combine with issues of political economy and political symbolism to make an otherwise
sensible market strategy a virtual impossibility. But this gets ahead of the story.
58. Volvo, for example, has long advertised the safety of its automobiles.
59. See Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. Atm. (forthcoming 1991); see also
authorities cited in Sunstein, supra note 49, at notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
60. I hasten to add that I am not fully persuaded by the case for self-paternalism, for I have no
idea how to make the real "us" stand up. As sages from Pogo to Bruce Ackerman remind us, "we
the people" seems to shift our characters along with shifts in decisional contexts. See B. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-62, 230-66 (1991). Yet, it would not be silly to imagine
that, here and elsewhere, we might use regulation-and eschew the market-to shape our tastes in
(sometimes) desired directions.
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where the party at fault pays for all the damage, the automobile buyer
does not reap all the rewards of buying a safer car. In fact, some of the
benefits go to the party charged with compensating the occupants of the
safer vehicles. Conversely, if the purchaser were the insurer of all damage occurring to or in his or her automobile, then the benefits of buying a
safer car would remain with the buyer. Universal first-party insurance,
or "no-fault insurance," produces this internalization of benefits. Under
a no-fault scheme, insurers make premiums dependent in part on the
safety of the insured's automobile. In this way, the savings from insurance costs are an incentive for drivers to demand, and consequently manufacturers to produce, safer vehicles.
No-fault insurance champions have been around for years, 6 1 and
several states have adopted some version of no-fault liability. 62 Lower
litigation costs and faster compensation have driven these schemes. That
the costs and benefits of vehicle safety correlate with consumer demand
for vehicle safety makes no-fault even more attractive. Civil liability reform and vehicle safety regulation are combined in such a scheme.
Unfortunately, no-fault insurance cannot serve as a complete strategy for automobile safety improvement. The principal problem is that
insurance companies may well be unable to experience-rate the safety of
automobiles on the basis of actual road experience. The necessary data
are unavailable at the time of the purchase and initial insurance on new
cars. Thus, the scheme would work only if cars maintained the same
safety characteristics over substantial time periods. New models would
need to be evaluated on the basis of data collected on older models.
However, the safety characteristics of car models are not constant.
Consumer Reports, which analyzes NHTSA's crash tests, repeatedly
warns that even minor annual changes in a car model can significantly
affect its crashworthiness. 63 Models that perform well one year may perform poorly the next. In addition, NHTSA's analyses of crash data often
do not agree with the analyses done by insurance companies. The data
are simply not good enough to permit a fine-grained determination of the
likely safety experience of new cars at the point of sale.
61.

The classic work is R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC

VICTIM (1965).
62. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); Kansas Automobile Injury
Reparations Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1986 & Supp. 1990); New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to :6A-35 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991);
Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act, N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1991); Motor Vehicle Personal and Property Protection Act, MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
63. See Which Cars Do Best in a Crash?, CONSUMER REP., April 1991, at 219, 221.
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Despite these doubts about the efficiency of no-fault insurance, some
safety improvements are consistent with such a scheme. Dramatically
safer technologies, such as the air bag, can be promoted. Moreover, implementation via no-fault insurance has advantages over NHTSA-style
rulemaking. The latter encounters several legal and political problems
that Harfst and I review in our book: a wavering political commitment
in Congress; dilatory executive monitoring; a constitutional skepticism
about administrative rulemaking that is expressed through judicial review; information advantages of the regulated industry; concerns about
domestic competitiveness and autoworkers' unemployment; an ambivalent public; and extreme variations in different administrations' commitments to vehicle safety. 64 By contrast, a no-fault system exerts
decentralized economic pressure to improve vehicle safety on parties responsive to such incentives. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
automobile, an American symbol of individual autonomy, would be symbolically unshackled from government mandates. The American freedom machine would once again be free.
But before jumping to the conclusion that, with better data and forecasting, no-fault insurance is a motor vehicle safety panacea, think about
getting there from here. In short, reconsider politics. What symbols can
be used to promote this general deterrence strategy and to what public
values will they appeal? Safety and public health are always available as
slogans, as are the claims of faster and more efficient compensation.
Such a legislative campaign may even utilize the catchword "privatization"-a rejection of centralized bureaucracy in favor of claimant-activated civil justice and consumer-oriented market incentives.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that many will flock to these banners.
Opposing forces will likely counter with themes of "justice"-no-fault
regimes do not permit compensation for pain and suffering. Additionally, no-fault programs must either be promoted state-by-state, or pursued nationally, thus confronting the states rights ideology that has
historically defended state control of tort law and insurance regulation.
In short, either strategy seems doomed.
Notwithstanding the social advantages of no-fault insurance, the experience of this scheme in .the United States suggests that defenders of
the status quo have a decided political advantage. No major organized
economic interest anticipates gains from a shift to no-fault. The insurance companies lose if the scheme reduces accident costs. Overall levels
of compensable loss shrink by the elimination of noneconomic losses. In
fact, even if accident rates are unaffected, casualty insurance premiums
64. See J. MASHAW & D. HARFST, supra note 1, at 242-43.
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and associated investment income decline. The insurance industry also
will see this as the first step toward federal regulation of the entire industry. Other powerful groups, such as the American Trial Lawyer's Association, will join the fight in opposing no-fault.
This is not to say that well-devised no-fault insurance proposals
have no prospect for legislative adoption. A similar appraisal in 1966
would not have predicted the passage of the MVSA. But there is some
very rough political sledding here. When combined with doubts about
efficacy in action, the political economy of the enactment of universal nofault insurance makes reliance on that strategy deeply problematic.
To summarize, the question of what works-or as Sunstein frames
it, the question of whiat the substantive provisions of administrative law
should look like65 -is not easily approachable in general terms. If Sunstein's preference for market incentives is only a rule of thumb that encourages policymakers to experiment with such systems, and judges to
permit that experimentation where not precluded by statute, then the
position is unobjectionable. But it is not much of a reform program.
This preference describes the thrust of administration policies from
Carter to Bush, as well as the legal environment enshrined in Chevron.
That we are not moving more quickly toward this particular substantive
goal suggests the intrusion of "feasibility" problems of the sort exempli66
fied by the motor vehicle safety discussion.
Moreover, a more contextualized approach to substantive analysis
reveals the difficulties of using substantive presumptions in some stronger
form. The "findings" of the political-economy scholarship on which
more generalized presumptions might be based are weak, and unless one
is prepared to ground some presuppositions about appropriate regulatory
form normatively, rather than positively, it may be very difficult to construct a useful or "valid" substantive administrative law-as distinguished from a useful or valid environmental law, labor law,
communications law, and so on. This is, of course, the presupposition of
the conventional, "proceduralized" administrative law of which Sunstein
complains.
His complaint has been made by others, and it is hardly without
merit. As one observes the ceaseless wrangling in decided cases concerning the niceties of administrative hearings and the "procedural rationality" of agency policy choices, administrative law does seem to exhibit a
sure instinct for the capillary. So much hoopla about so little of apparent
65. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 611-22.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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substantive moment. Yet, I wonder whether the complaint is not overdrawn in two senses.
First, the notion that administrative law lacks substantive commitments is simply false. As a subfield of constitutional law, administrative
law has strong and continuous normative commitments to procedural
fairness, decisional transparency, and administrative accountability. 67
These are administrative law's distinctive embodiments of a more general
liberal, democratic ideological agenda that supports individual autonomy
and civic equality through precisely those structures of eighteenth-century legal thought that provoke Chris Edley's critique. Indeed, unless
that "substance" of administrative law existed-in however compromised and tortured a form one takes it to have achieved over these last
two hundred years-Edley's arguments would be unintelligible.
Second, Sunstein's critique of substantive emptiness ironically
equates administrative law with judicial review, while simultaneously
urging that administrative law's continued focus on judicial review is the
myopia to be avoided. If one looks at legislative and administrative
(rather than judicial) action, it is difficult to avoid concluding that significant substantive innovation is constantly occurring. The 1970s and
1980s saw major revolutions in the legislatively-provided structures and
mandates of administrative regulatory agencies, 68 continuous legislative
attention to issues of administrative openness, 69 and major executive
branch initiatives to promote the evaluation of regulatory alternatives in
67. Once again, this point has been made by Sunstein elsewhere. See Sunstein, Factions SelfInterest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. Rav. 271 (1986).
68. See, eg., S. MELNICK, supra note 40, at 5-9 (1983) (describing the purpose, scope, and
structure of the "new regulation"); see also J. MASHAW & D. HARSr, supra note 1, at 1-7 (describing how the MVSA "should be seen as creating the first of a new breed of federal regulatory agencies
... concerned with health and safety").
69. See, eg., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Privacy Act, id. § 552a;
Government in the Sunshine Act, id. § 552b; Federal Advisory Committee Act, id. app. at 1175-83.
Multiple amendments have been made to these statutes during the last two decades. For the Freedom of Information Act amendments, see Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54;
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64; Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247; Act of Oct. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 906(a)(10), 92 Stat.
1225; Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402(2), 98 Stat. 3357; Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, §§ 1802-1803, 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-49. For the Privacy Act amendments, see Act of
Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-183, § 2(2), 89 Stat. 1057; Act of Oct. 25, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365,
§ 2, 96 Stat. 1749; Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-375, § 201(a)-(b), 96 Stat. 1821; Act of Jan.
12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-452, § 2(a)(1), 96 Stat. 2478; Act of Oct. 15, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-497,
§ 107(g), 98 Stat. 2292; Act of Oct. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, §§ 2-6(a), 7, 8, 102 Stat. 2507-14;
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 7201(b)(1), 104 Stat. 1388. There have been no amendments to the Government in the Sunshine Act. For the Federal Advisory Committee Act amendments, see Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(c), 90 Stat. 1247; Act of Dec. 21, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-375, § 201(c), 96 Stat. 1822.
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cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness terms. 70 The causes and cures of "regulatory failure" are being addressed in the administrative law created by
both Congress and the Executive Branch, however laggard the judiciary
may be in this regard.
III.

CONCLUSION

It may well be true, as Chris Edley suggests, that administrative law
agonizes about its content and its future more than other fields. But, if
so, I would argue that this public teeth-gnashing is evidence more of its
students' and practitioners' openness to new ideas than of its intellectual
bankruptcy. Administrative law has a core in exactly the same sense as
torts, contracts, or any other major legal domain-a set of general propositions that take on life and meaning only as applied in particular contexts. Therefore, it is as open (but not more open) to the charge that
because understanding context is imperative, the core concepts must
either be irrelevant or incoherent.
In my view, the special failure of administrative law scholarship lies
neither in its failure to take ideological substance seriously (as Edley
charges) nor in its focus on matters of institutional and procedural design
(as in Sunstein's account). Rather, its failure is its inability to make explicit the continuous and necessary oscillation between matters of principle and matters of implementation, that is, between general normative
commitments and the concrete necessities of governance in particular
contexts. As Edley and Sunstein argue, administrative law may need a
stronger defense of its ideological premises and greater attention to both
the particular and the more general political, economic, and technological contexts of its application. But the deeper need is somewhat different.
We need a better way of talking about the refraction of premises through
contexts, and contexts through premises. That is where the real law
lives, grows, and hides.7 1 Otherwise, as we try to remember the real past
and imagine the possible future we will be too easily mesmerized, and
then frustrated, by doctrinal epiphenomena.
70. These executive initiatives begin with the "quality of life review" program in the Office of
Management and Budget during the Nixon Administration and carry on through increasingly stringent requirements embodied in Executive Orders by Presidents Ford (Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3
C.F.R. § 926 (1975)), Carter (Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1978)), and Reagan (Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1988); Exec. Order
No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1988)).
71. See generally J. MASHAW, supra note 44, at 15 (My attempt to develop an "internal law of
administration."). For a provocative discussion of the necessity of broadening the focus of administrative law teaching and scholarship, see Schotland, "How Much Truth Is Too Much Truth for Judicial Review?" and OtherEasy Pieces After an AALS Workshop on TeachingAdministrative Law, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 113 (1991).

